The Social Construction of Risk in Digital Preservation by Frank, Rebecca D.
The Social Construction of Risk in Digital Preservation 
Rebecca D. Frank 
 
Note: This paper was published in the Journal of the Association for Information Science and 
Technology. Please cite the published version. 
DOI: 10.1002/asi.24247 
ABSTRACT 
Digital information is fragile, yet access to digital information over time is a critical 
underpinning of core values and functions in our society, from open government to research and 
scholarship. Digital preservation research has focused on identifying technical, economic, and 
organizational sources of risk and has relied on an assumption that individuals will behave in 
rational and predictable ways in response to the same information. This article asserts that 
viewing digital preservation as a process that takes place in complex social contexts is just as 
important as thinking about digital preservation in terms of technological or economic issues. 
This is particularly important for understanding how individuals involved in digital preservation 
construct their understanding of risk because social factors influence how people construct their 
understanding of, and behave in response to, risk information. The author proposes an eight-
factor model for the social construction of risk, which includes: communication, complexity, 
expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability. The article 
demonstrates how these factors influence individuals as they construct their understanding of risk 
in the context of digital preservation and how this in turn affects digital preservation decisions. 
The Social Construction of Risk in Digital Preservation
Rebecca D. Frank, PhD
University of Michigan School of Information, 4322 North Quad, 105 S. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1285.
E-mail: frankrd@umich.edu
Digital information is fragile, yet access to digital informa-
tion over time is a critical underpinning of core values
and functions in our society, from open government to
research and scholarship. Digital preservation research
has focused on identifying technical, economic, and orga-
nizational sources of risk and has relied on an assumption
that individuals will behave in rational and predictable
ways in response to the same information. This article
asserts that viewing digital preservation as a process that
takes place in complex social contexts is just as important
as thinking about digital preservation in terms of techno-
logical or economic issues. This is particularly important
for understanding how individuals involved in digital pres-
ervation construct their understanding of risk because
social factors influence how people construct their under-
standing of, and behave in response to, risk information.
The author proposes an eight-factor model for the social
constructionof risk,which includes: communication, com-
plexity, expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, un-
certainty, and vulnerability. The article demonstrates how
these factors influence individuals as they construct their
understanding of risk in the context of digital preservation
and how this in turn affects digital preservation decisions.
Introduction
Access to digital information is a critical underpinning of
core values and functions in our society, from open govern-
ment, to individual rights, to research and scholarship. The
creation of this digital content often represents a substantial
investment of time and resources. For example, every year
the National Science Foundation (NSF) spends billions of
dollars on research. In 2017 the NSF had a budget of ~$7.5
billion and supported the work of 359,000 people (The
National Science Foundation, 2018). Since 2011 the NSF
has required that all proposals include data management
plans including information about plans to deposit data with
a repository in order to ensure that they will be disseminated
and preserved (National Science Foundation, 2011). Despite
these efforts to ensure the longevity of this valuable digital
information, it remains fragile:
Gone is the promise of preserving knowledge forever. We are
replacing books, maps, and audiovisual recordings with com-
puter code that is less stable than human memory itself. Code
is rapidly overwritten or rendered obsolete by new code. Digi-
tal data are completely dependent on machines to render them
accessible to human perception. In turn, those machines are
completely dependent on uninterrupted supplies of energy to
run the server farms that store and serve digital data. (Smith
Rumsey, 2016, p. 8)
Digital preservation is about ensuring the viability, sustain-
ability, and accessibility of that digital information over time
(Berman, 2008). In order to accomplish this, information re-
searchers and professionals have taken an approach to digital
preservation that focuses on identifying and assessing risks in
order to create and implement risk mitigation strategies and
systems that will ensure the viability, sustainability, and acces-
sibility of digital information over time (for instance, Bar-
ateiro, Antunes, Freitas, & Borbinha, 2010; Berman, 2008).
Indeed, risk management has been considered a conceptual
foundation for digital preservation for more than 20 years
(Conway, 1996).
Approaches that consider digital preservation as risk
management depend upon the ability of people and organi-
zations to accurately and effectively assess risk. While
some of the risks associated with digital preservation activ-
ities, such as media deterioration and file format obsoles-
cence (for instance, Ohshima, 2010), storage failures (for
instance, Vermaaten, Lavoie, & Caplan, 2012), and disas-
ters, attacks, and economic failures (for instance, Barateiro
et al., 2010), are known and understood, we know that
even when risks are known people are generally poor at
judging how to act in response to those risks (Kahneman,
2013). This poor judgment is based in part on the fact that
risk is socially constructed and different actors have differ-
ing perceptions of risk.
In this article I assert that risk in digital preservation is a
socially constructed phenomenon and propose a model for the
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social construction of risk in digital preservation that builds on
existing research to argue that digital preservation is a process
in which social and technical elements interact within organi-
zations and institutions to shape the perceptions of individuals
and groups who carry out the work of preserving digital con-
tent (for instance, Conway, 2010; Hughes, 2012; MacKenzie,
2012). I argue that sources of risk in digital preservation can-
not be considered as merely technical, economic, or organiza-
tional. Rather, digital preservation is also a social process in
which risks are interpreted by individuals who exist and work
within particular cultural contexts (Burgess, 2015). Their sub-
sequent actions are influenced by social factors that shape their
perception. In other words, people construct their understand-
ing of risk based on a number of social factors, and individuals
may behave differently in response to the same information
depending on how they construct their understanding of risk.
A Model for the Social Construction of Risk in
Digital Preservation
In the section below I present a model for the social con-
struction of risk in digital preservation. The section begins
with a discussion of risk, which is a foundational concept for
both digital preservation and this model. Following that, I
describe each of the eight factors that comprise the model.
Risk
This model is based on an understanding of risk as a con-
cept that is constructed through social processes and situated
within particular social contexts (Burgess, 2015). Risks, from
this perspective, “are created and selected by human actors”
(Renn, 2008, p. 11). The concept of risk can therefore have dif-
ferent meanings for different people (Slovic, 1987), and the
ways in which those people construct their understanding of
risk are influenced by social factors (for instance, Dake, 1992;
Renn, 2008; Wilkinson, 2001). While I agree with researchers
such as Conway (1996) that risk management is foundational
for digital preservation, I argue here that risk should be under-
stood as a socially constructed phenomenon. Approaches that
consider risk primarily as a calculable, discoverable value (for
instance, International Organization for Standardization, 2009;
International Organization for Standardization Technical Com-
mittee, 2018) assume that people will respond to information
in the same way, and are not sufficient to account for the ways
in which social factors and circumstances influence how peo-
ple construct their understanding of risk in digital preservation.
A classical definition of risk from the Royal Society
includes elements that are common across the literature
from a variety of disciplines: an adverse event or hazard,
and the likelihood of that event (Royal Society (Great Brit-
ain) & Study Group on Risk, 1983). While this report
describes risk as the probability of some adverse event,
other definitions include the magnitude of consequences of
an adverse event: “[r]isk is the combination of the likeli-
hood of an event and the consequences of that event”
(Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009, p. 230). Taking
this definition one step further, additional research has
established the importance of causation “[d]efinitions of
particular risks include at least three conceptual elements:
an object deemed to ‘pose’ the risk, a putative harm, and a
linkage alleging some form of causation between the object
and the harm” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 40).
Similarly, ISO 31000, a standard for Risk Management,
describes risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives, and
specifies that risk typically includes a source, an event, and the
consequences and likelihood of that event (International Organi-
zation for Standardization Technical Committee, 2018). This
standard describes risk management as “the process whereby
organisations methodically address the risks attaching to their
activities with the goal of achieving sustained benefit within
each activity and across the portfolio of all activities” (Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization Technical Committee,
2018, p. 2). While the view of risk presented here does specify a
relationship between risk and uncertainty, it assumes that people
will behave predictably in response to the same information.
As these examples demonstrate, risk is generally described
as some combination of probability and magnitude of conse-
quence relating to a hazard or adverse event (for instance,
Gardoni & Murphy, 2013; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Rowe,
1977). The assumption here is that both probability and mag-
nitude can be reduced to measurable, calculable quantities (for
instance, Fischhoff, 1983). These definitions of risk rely upon
the concept of a rational actor, and fail to take into account the
idea that social factors might influence the way that individ-
uals perceive and construct their understanding of risk:
The classical risk approach assumes that it is possible to define
and assess risks. The assumption that risks can be objectified
and calculated has met with a lot of criticism. Notions like
complexity and uncertainty to characterize the risk situation
have played a central role in clarifying the limits of the classi-
cal risk approach. (van Est, Walhout, & Brom, 2012,
p. 1075).
In contrast to this classical definition of risk, scholars
across a variety of disciplines have found that “risks are cre-
ated and selected by human actors” (Renn, 2008, p. 11). And,
given the fact that risks are fundamentally human creations,
Renn (2008) defines risk perception as “the outcome of
processing, assimilation and evaluation of personal experi-
ences or information about risk by individuals or groups in
society” (p. 64). In this view, “the concept ‘risk’means differ-
ent things to different people” (Slovic, 1987, p. 283).
Some interpretations of social construction acknowledge
objective conditions, and link perception to those conditions. In
other words, a constructivist view of risk in digital preservation
is not inconsistent with a classical definition of risk, but rather
shows that this classical view represents an incomplete picture
of risk, as it does not account for the ways in which people con-
struct their own understanding or perception of risk in response
to the information that comprises that classical definition (for
instance, object, hazard, likelihood, and consequences). Theo-
ries of risk perception, in contrast, hold that people construct
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differing understandings of the probability and adverse conse-
quences of events, that these differing understandings are the
result of social, organizational, and/or political factors, and
that they shape the ways in which people behave in response to
risk information (Lachlan, Burke, Spence, & Griffin, 2009;
Nelkin, 1989; Nickel & Vaesen, 2012; van Est et al., 2012;
Wildavsky&Dake, 1990).
Digital preservation as an academic discipline has engaged
with the concept of risk as a knowable, quantifiable figure that
technical systems must be designed to overcome (for instance,
Barateiro et al., 2010). This approach to digital preservation
relies on positivistic perspectives and is heavily influenced
by computer science (for instance, Barateiro, Antunes, &
Borbinha, 2011). Digital preservation scholarship addressing
the concept of risk consists mainly of identifying and classify-
ing types of vulnerabilities or threats, and individual case
studies describing actions taken by a particular repository (for
instance, Vermaaten et al., 2012). The literature in this area,
which consists largely of self-produced case studies about spe-
cific organizations, treats risk as an objective value and does
not engage meaningfully with the notion that perceptions of
risk, rather than the risk itself, drive decision-making and
action with regard to digital preservation (Ross & McHugh,
2006). These positivistic attitudes about risk in digital preser-
vation form the basis for an underlying assumption among
many digital preservation researchers and practitioners: that
the stakeholders involved in digital preservation processes
have the same perceptions of risk and therefore interpret risk
information in the sameway.
The model below represents an analytical framework of
risk that is based on a definition of risk as a socially con-
structed phenomenon and draws on eight social factors that
influence how people and groups construct their under-
standings of risk: communication, complexity, expertise,
organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vul-
nerability. Each of these factors is examined in greater
detail below (Figure 1).
Communication
The way that risk information is communicated influences
the manner in which an individual constructs his or her under-
standing of risk (Bostrom, 2014; Chung, 2011; Kasperson &
Kasperson, 1996; Konheim, 1988; Lachlan et al., 2009; Renn,
1991; Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992).
Theories of risk amplification and attenuation argue that com-
munication provides a lens through which individuals receive
risk information, and that perceptions of risk vary depending
on a number of factors, including the source, method, channel,
and means of communication (for instance, Bostrom, 2014;
Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). Indeed, “social interactions
may either amplify or attenuate the signals to society about the
risk” (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996, p. 96). Information
about risk can be communicated in different ways and those
different means of communication, in turn, influence informa-
tion processing and interpretation.
The amplification (or attenuation) of risk information can
take place in a myriad of ways, and can involvemany different
types of actors and organizations, including media, govern-
ment, political actors, scientists, or other experts (Arvai, 2007;
Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Lachlan et al., 2009). Differ-
ent individuals, if given the same risk information from the
same source, will not necessarily perceive risks in the same
way, and so it is important to consider both the audience and
the mode of communication any time risk information is com-
municated (Arvai, 2007).
Understanding how communication can influence per-
ceptions of risk is important for digital preservation, a
sociotechnical process in which individuals within digital
repositories work together to assess and mitigate risk. Fur-
thermore, “[r]isk analysis, then, requires an approach that
is capable of illuminating risk in its full complexity, is sen-
sitive to the social settings in which risk occurs, and also
recognizes that social interactions may either amplify or
attenuate the signals to society about risk” (Kasperson &
Kasperson, 1996, p. 96). Risk analysis and/or mitigation
processes can have unintended consequences on risk per-
ception that arise not from the information itself but rather
from the social factors surrounding the risk, the assessment
process, and the ways in which all of those things are com-
municated. Risk perception can be amplified or attenuated
as a result of the ways that technical information about risk
is communicated.
To summarize, the transmission of risk information from
an information source to a receiver influences the way in
which that information is received, and “messages have a
meaning for the receiver only within a sociocultural context”
(Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 180). In the context of digital
preservation, for example, risk information can be communi-
cated to and/or from digital repository staff and administra-
tors; other repository stakeholders such as users, content
creators, and designated community members; and external
parties such as partner organizations. Professional discourse
around digital preservation may also influence perceptions
of risk for different types of stakeholders depending on their
FIG. 1. Model for the social construction of risk in digital preservation.
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connections to the digital preservation community, and the
ways in which the communication norms of this community
either match or diverge from the communication norms of
their own professional communities.
Complexity
The second factor, complexity, has also been found to
influence risk perception. Research shows that high levels
of complexity in technical and social systems can make it
difficult to identify probabilities, consequences, and hazards
(Fischhoff, 1983; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; van Est et al.,
2012). van Est et al., (2012) argue that “the interactions of
humans and/or technological subsystems are much more com-
plex than an a priori risk assignment can capture” (p. 1076).
Perrow (1999) and Rijpma (1997) in particular have argued
that complexity results in interaction between seemingly inde-
pendent features within sociotechnical systems, and this com-
plexity may neutralize the benefits of redundancy and impair
organizational learning. In other words, complexity introduces
problems while also counteracting measures that are meant to
offset those problems. This research indicates that perceptions
of risk can be influenced by the complexity of sociotechnical
systems, which suggests that the differing levels of complexity
of digital repositories and in the organizations within which
they are situated may lead to varying perceptions of risk
for different stakeholders, depending on their level of familiar-
ity with different aspects of the repository. Other types of
complexity might be present in processes such as content
ingest, curation, and managing relationships with repository
stakeholders.
Repository staff face complexity inmanaging digital preser-
vation processes, which include complicated technical systems
and complex arrangements of people, policies and procedures,
and technologies, and also in terms of organizational and eco-
nomic factors relating to the repository. They may have differ-
ing perspectives on these complexities depending on their
backgrounds, and their roles within the repository. External
actors, such as designated community members, auditors, or
funding agencies, may understand risk for a repository differ-
ently, depending on the complexity of the repository environ-
ment, and the complexity of their own organization. For
example, repositories that are positioned within larger organi-
zations such as universities, consortia, or partnerships are likely
to have complex governance structures that may heighten or
minimize risks relating to organizational governance for repos-
itory staff members and/or organizational administrators.
People who are not directly involved in digital preservation
activities may also view repositories differently, depending on
how complexity is communicated, because documentation
efforts by repository staff that attempt to make repository
processes comprehensible through simplification may in fact
mask the underlying complexity that external parties seek to
understand. Indeed, Wilkinson argues that “[a]ny attempt to
mask the complexity of the social experience of risk percep-
tion in rigid conceptual abstractions may lead us further away,
rather than towards a more intimate understanding of the day-
to-day reality in which people recognize and negotiate with
‘hazards’ as ‘risks’” (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 11).
In short, high levels of complexity in technical and
social systems can make it difficult to identify probabili-
ties, consequences, and hazards (for instance, Fischhoff,
1983; Perrow, 1999; Rijpma, 1997; van Est et al., 2012).
The differing levels of complexity of digital repositories,
and of the organizations within which they are situated,
may lead to varying perceptions of risk for different stake-
holders depending on their level of familiarity with differ-
ent aspects of the repository and/or digital preservation
processes.
Expertise
The third factor included in this model is expertise. A
great deal of literature about the social construction of risk
focuses on the differences between experts and nonexperts
(for instance, Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hilgartner, 1992;
Kasperson &Kasperson, 1996; Konheim, 1988; Perrow, 1999;
Slovic, 1987; Tversky&Kahneman, 1974; Vaughan& Seifert,
1992; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Wynne, 1992). It was previ-
ously thought that experts had more accurate understandings of
risk because they had greater levels of knowledge about the fac-
tors that contribute to risk, and that their understanding of risk
was more objective and/or rational than that of nonexperts (for
instance, Otway, 1992; Starr, 1969;Wynne, 1992).
However, as researchers have developed a deeper under-
standing of the ways that experts and nonexperts differ in con-
structing understandings of risk, research has come to support
the idea that risk assessment and management efforts should
include both perspectives:
[p]erhaps the most important message from this research is
that there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and
perceptions. Lay people sometimes lack certain information
about hazards. However, their basic conceptualization of risk
is much richer than that of the experts and reflects legitimate
concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk assess-
ments. (Slovic, 1987, p. 285)
Research has found that the distinction between experts and
lay people, or nonexperts, is misguided, and that individuals
with different experiences and types of knowledge bring dif-
ferent types of expertise to bear on assessments of risk
(Pidgeon, 1998). Rather than a clear division between experts
and nonexperts, a digital repository consists of people with
varying levels of expertise in different aspects of the reposi-
tory. Broadly speaking, repositories typically consist of people
with administrative expertise, digital preservation expertise,
and information technology (IT) expertise, and each of these
types of people are involved in the work of preserving digital
content. Each of these types of people has deep, focused
knowledge in some areas of repository management but may
be considered a novice with regard to others. This knowledge,
paired with a lack of similar expertise in other areas of reposi-
tory management, has the potential to influence perceptions of
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risk by opening their eyes to some types of risk and closing
them to others.
With regard to digital preservation, these varying levels
of expertise may influence attitudes about risk differently,
depending on how involved each person is in particular
aspects of preservation and repository management, and on
how much they rely on and trust the expertise of others, or
the perspectives of those who lack the familiarity of experts.
In summary, “experts are often in a privileged position
in terms of information, even if their values and decision
processes are not always employed optimally. On the other
hand, while non-experts may not possess as much relevant
factual information, they may be in a position to augment
expert risk analyses with additional useful information”
(Pidgeon, 1998, p. 12). In order to understand how risk is
constructed in digital preservation, it is important to con-
sider the role of expertise both in terms of the information
and experience that different people and groups possess, as
well as how they perceive the expertise of others.
Organizations
The fourth factor in the model is organizations. Organiza-
tions are “both centres for processing and handling risks and
potential producers and exporters of risk” (Hutter & Power,
2005, p. 1). Hutter and Power (2005) argue that risk analysis
and risk management are both activities that take place within
organizations, and that these activities rely on social construc-
tions of risk knowledge that are framed within the structure of
the organization. Alternately, rather than constructing a shared
perception of risk for all members, individuals within an orga-
nization may perceive risk differently depending on their roles
(Hutter, 2005).
Most formal risk assessment and management takes place
within organizations; “[i]f selection of risk is a matter of social
organization, the management of risk is an organizational
problem” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 198). The ways
that the organization and/or its members might share, or have
differing perceptions of, risk can influence the outcome of the
risk assessment or management activities (Hutter, 2005; for
instance, Hutter & Power, 2005; Renn, 2008; Vaughan, 1996,
2005). Similarly, outcomes can be affected by whether the
individuals conducting the assessment are a part of the organi-
zation or if they are outsiders, as this will also influence their
likelihood of sharing the risk perception of the organization
being assessed (Vaughan, 1996).
For digital preservation, each repository is a separate orga-
nization that may shape perceptions of risk for its members in
different ways. In some cases repositories themselves consist
of separate organizations, which have joined together for a
common purpose. External actors such as designated commu-
nity members also belong to organizations that may shape
their perceptions of risk in ways that differ from the repository
staff members. It is possible that individuals or groups will
have varying perceptions of risk based on their positions
within their own organizations, in a manner similar to the
influence of expertise as described above. Position within an
organization is, in some cases, related to expertise because
people are likely to be situated within groups based on their
expertise (for instance, IT, digital preservation, and so on).
However, lines of communication within organizations do
not always follow these functional lines. Organizations with
matrix reporting structures, for example, may influence per-
ceptions of risk in different ways than more traditional or
siloed organizations.
Organizations, in short, can both create and manage risk.
People construct their understanding of risk in ways that are
shaped by their positions in, and/or relationships with, orga-
nizations. Complexity, communication, and expertise are all
closely related to the organizational context in which the
work of digital preservation takes place, and can shape the
ways in which people perceive and construct their under-
standing of risk.
Political Culture
Political culture and national context influence how risks
are defined (Beck, 1992; Jasanoff, 1986; Parthasarathy, 2007).
Dake (1991) argues that “mental models of risk are not solely
matters of individual cognition, but also correspond to world-
views entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding soci-
ety, its functioning, and its potential fate” (p. 62). This
argument is based on the assumption that individuals exist
within social, cultural, and political spheres, that they perceive
risks within those contexts, and that their perceptions of risks
are influenced by those contexts (Dake, 1991). Indeed,
Parthasarathy (2007) argues that political culture shapes prac-
tices and artifacts in ways that vary across political boundaries,
and that the differences among political cultures can explain
some of the challenges to transnational technology transfer.
Perceptions of risk are constructed and shaped not only
by the political culture within which individuals exist, but
also by their place or role within that culture (Beck, 1992).
For Beck (1992, 1999), relative power within political cul-
ture influences perceptions of risk in that individuals, orga-
nizations, or groups with greater power are able to reduce
their exposure to risk. Much like theories of vulnerability
described below, risk perception depends in part on
whether an individual has control over their own level of
exposure to risk.
In addition to the fact that political culture shapes per-
ceptions of risk, Jasanoff (1998) contends that, “[t]heories
of risk perception are inherently political because they
carry within them implicit understandings about how to
organize and implement policies for managing risk … peo-
ple’s attitudes toward risk partly reflect their feelings of
power, or lack thereof, in relation to the sources of risk”
(p. 93). Individuals perceive risks within their own cultural
and political context, and it is within this same context that
decisions about how to respond to those risks are formu-
lated and implemented.
To summarize, research about risk and political culture
has shown that individuals perceive risks within their own
cultural and political context, and it is within this same
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context that decisions about how to respond to those risks
are formulated and implemented (for instance, Dake, 1991;
Jasanoff, 1986, 1998; Parthasarathy, 2007). Additionally,
attitudes about risk reflect feelings of power, or lack of
power, in relation to potential sources of risk (Jasanoff,
1998). In the case of digital preservation, repository man-
agers may be influenced in their perceptions of risk by
political events such as the defunding of heritage organiza-
tions on a national scale (for instance, CBC News, 2012).
Individuals involved in repository audit processes may
have different understandings of risk, depending on their
positions and feelings of power within their own organiza-
tions and on their feelings of power between their organi-
zations. For example, repository staff may view threats as
more risky if they feel that they lack the power or authority
to enact risk mitigation strategies.
Trust
Trust, the sixth factor included in this model, influences how
people construct their understanding of risk. Wynne, for exam-
ple, argued that “public experiences of risks, risk communica-
tions, or any other scientific information is never, and can never
be, a purely intellectual process, about reception of knowledge
per se” (1992, p. 281). Rather, “the trustworthiness and credi-
bility of the social institutions concerned are basic to people’s
definitions of risks” (1992, p. 300). Information about risks can-
not be separated from its context, but rather is informed by the
norms around knowledge production within communities.
Similarly, Wildavsky and Dake (1990) found that “the
great struggles over the perceived dangers of technology in
our time are essentially about trust and distrust of societal
institutions, that is, about cultural conflict” and that “risk
perceptions and preferences are predictable given individual
differences in cultural biases” (1990, pp. 56, 57). Nelkin
argued that not only does trust affect perceptions of risk, but
that trust (or mistrust) can be a guiding factor in how risk is
defined: “[d]efining risk can become a way of explaining
the failure of existing political or social relationships, of
voicing mistrust, of delegating blame” (Nelkin, 1989, p. 98).
Findings from Wynne (1992), Wildavsky and Dake (1990),
and Nelkin (1989) indicate that relationships exist between
individuals and institutions, and among people with different
types of expertise, and that trust is an important factor in
these relationships. Lack of trust both influences and can be
influenced by risk perception, and can impact efforts to
assess and manage risk.
In the domain of digital preservation, discussions about
trust have focused on online environments (for instance,
Berman, 2008; Colati & Colati, 2009; Corritore, Kracher, &
Wiedenbeck, 2003; De Santis, Scannapieco, & Catarci, 2003;
Dryden, 2011; Kelton, Fleischmann, & Wallace, 2008;
MacNeil, 2000; Mutula, 2011; Yakel, Faniel, Kriesberg, &
Yoon, 2013; Yoon, 2014, 2016), and also on the development
of criteria for the evaluation of digital repositories (for
instance, Becker & Rauber, 2011; Day, 2008; RLG-NARA
Digital Repository Certification Task Force, 2007). This
scholarship relies upon the idea that “[t]rust is instrumental for
the preservation of digital media” (Hart & Liu, 2003, p. 95).
Given that trust is necessary for the preservation of digital
information, and that this preservation frequently takes place
in digital repositories, wemust consider how trust is conceptu-
alized for digital repositories. Jantz andGiarlo (2007) note that
digital repositories are unique among the various types of
digital organizations (such as for-profit businesses conducting
e-commerce), and as such “for the digital repository, trust
involves scholarship, authenticity, reliability, and persistence
over time and has little relationship to immediate financial
rewards” (2007, p. 197).
This line of inquiry—scholarship about digital preservation
and trust—leads to the concept of the trustworthy digital
repository (TDR). While there are several different standards
for TDRs (for instance, ISO 16363, CoreTrustSeal, nestor,
and so on), common elements of these standards include a
commitment to providing reliable long-term access to digital
information, the ability to assess and mitigate risks, and the
desirability that repositories demonstrate that they are able to
do so (for instance, Consultative Committee for Space Data
Systems, 2012; Dale & Gore, 2010; Dillo & De Leeuw, 2018;
Keitel, 2012; McHugh, Ross, Innocenti, Ruusalepp, & Hoff-
man, 2008).
In sum, information about risk cannot be separated from
the context in which it exists. Trust (or mistrust) is an impor-
tant factor in the relationships between individuals and insti-
tutions, and can be a guiding influence in how risk is defined
(Nelkin, 1989;Wynne, 1992). The work of preserving digital
information frequently takes place in organizations such as
digital repositories, and trust among the individuals, groups,
and/or institutions involved in the work of preserving digital
content can shape how people construct their understanding
and perceptions of risk. For example, risk assessment and
management activities such as those required for TDR certi-
fication depend upon stakeholders in those activities having
trust in others.
Uncertainty
Seventh, uncertainty has been identified as a factor that
influences how individuals perceive and understand risks
(for instance, Starr, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;
van Est et al., 2012). Scholars have characterized risk cal-
culations that take place under conditions of both specula-
tion and ignorance as representing uncertainty about either
the probability or magnitude of the consequences of an
event (Starr, 2003; van Est et al., 2012). Tversky and Kah-
neman argued that people rely on heuristic principles when
making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, and that
these heuristics can lead to “severe and systematic errors”
(1974, p. 1124).
More recently, scholars have argued that the dichotomy
between probability and magnitude is flawed and that it is
more productive to talk about risks themselves as uncertain
rather than uncertainty in particular elements of risk: “cur-
rent risk assessment is mostly future-oriented. The basis for
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risk assessment, therefore, has shifted from probability,
based on experience in the past, to possibility, based on
expectations about the future” (van Est et al., 2012,
p. 1077). In this view, probability and magnitude cannot
really be separated when considering uncertainty for risk.
Rather, these elements combine to make risks themselves
uncertain.
The research described above indicates that perceptions
of risk can be influenced by the existence and/or recognition
of uncertainty. Uncertainty affects different types of people
in different ways, as levels of expertise or knowledge about
particular events, systems, or risks can influence the degree
of uncertainty that a given person perceives. Uncertainty
may influence digital preservation activities because people
involved in the work of preserving digital content are likely
to face uncertainty in a variety of areas such as organiza-
tional stability and funding.
Vulnerability
Finally, risk perception may also be influenced by factors
that heighten vulnerability or risk exposure, such as gender or
socioeconomic status. Research in this area argues that lived
experience, including exposure or vulnerability to risk, can
influence risk perception (Konheim, 1988; Olofsson et al.,
2014). In an article seeking to expand risk perception research
in the area of gender differences, Hitchcock (2001) makes the
point that people who benefit less from high-risk technology,
and who lack control over their own exposure to those tech-
nologies, live in a more dangerous or risky world than people
who benefit from these technologies or who are able to limit
their own exposure to them. Another study that focused on
gender, race, and risk perception with regard to environmental
risks concluded that, “perhaps women and nonwhite men see
the world as more dangerous because they benefit less from
many of its technologies and institutions, and because they
have less power and control” (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994,
p. 1107).
Those researchers argue that groups of people who lack
privilege may face greater exposure to risks, and that this
exposure may be thought of as independent of will or
choice. When viewed alongside Starr’s (1969) findings that
“the public is willing to accept ‘voluntary’ risks roughly
1,000 times greater than ‘involuntary’ risks,” this suggests
that risk perception will fluctuate as privilege and the abil-
ity to control one’s risk exposure varies (p. 1237). Individ-
uals who lack the ability to control their environment, and
who do not benefit from the sources of risk, may perceive
greater risk in any given situation than individuals who
occupy positions of relatively greater privilege. In other
words, choice matters, and the ability to choose one’s risk
exposure influences how much risk a person is willing to
accept in any given situation.
Understanding how vulnerability can influence risk per-
ception is important for digital preservation because individ-
uals involved in preserving digital content have varying levels
of control over the decisions made for their organizations, and
therefore experience vulnerability to external factors (based
on location, financial resources, and so on) differently. For
example, decisions about the geographic location of primary
and backup storage sites are made for many different reasons,
some practical and some political. Repository staff may have
different perceptions of risk depending on their own involve-
ment in the selection of sites. Similarly, staff members of
repositories that lack economic security (for instance, heavy
reliance on “soft money”) may also have different perceptions
of risk than repositories with more financial stability. Percep-
tions of risk may vary between repository staff and external
actors, as awareness of vulnerability (external actors) and
exposure to risk (repository staff) do not influence perceptions
of risk to the same degree (Starr, 1969).
To summarize, research has shown that lived experience,
including exposure or vulnerability to risk, can influence risk
perception (for instance, Konheim, 1988; Olofsson et al., 2014).
This view of risk perception corresponds to the section about
organizations above, which argues that vulnerability and privi-
lege can affect risk perception—because different roles within
an organization have varying amounts of perceived and real
power, control, vulnerability, and exposure to risk. People and
groups who experience greater vulnerability are likely to per-
ceive greater risk than those in positions of relative power and/or
privilege. Those involved in the work of preserving digital con-
tent may perceive greater risk to the content because of their
knowledge about vulnerabilities, or because of their own per-
sonal or professional vulnerability within their organization.
The elements described above represent eight social factors
that have the potential to influence how notions of risk are con-
structed in digital preservation: communication, complexity,
expertise, organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty,
and vulnerability. In the following section I will discuss this
model in the context of TDR certification in order to provide
an example that illustrates how social factors influence percep-
tions of risk in a digital preservation context. This example also
highlights the fact that the factors in this model are inter-
connected, and have the potential to increase or lessen percep-
tions of risk where they intersect.
Discussion
In this article I have described a new framework to critically
examine risk in digital preservation as a socially constructed
phenomenon. This approach, which is informed by the large
body of research on the social construction of risk and risk per-
ception, considers the potential influence of social factors on
the actors who carry out digital preservation activities. This
model builds upon previous research about risk in digital pres-
ervation (for instance, Barateiro et al., 2010; Conway, 1996;
Vermaaten et al., 2012), and invites scholars to move beyond a
classical view of risk to consider not only the probability and
likelihood of a threat or hazard (for instance, International
Organization for Standardization, 2009; International Organi-
zation for Standardization Technical Committee, 2018), but
also to acknowledge that social factors influence how people
construct their understanding of risk in digital preservation.
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Research about digital preservation has tended to treat
risk as a discoverable and calculable figure. However, risk
is a foundational concept of digital preservation and a view
of risk that does not consider the ways that social factors
have been shown to influence how people perceive and
understand risk will be incomplete. What is needed is a
shift in understanding toward an approach that considers
the social context in which digital preservation activities
take place, in order to understand not just the likelihood
and consequences of a hazard, but also how people per-
ceive and behave in response to risk information.
In order to illustrate how each of the factors contributes
to the model above (communication, complexity, expertise,
organizations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vul-
nerability), it is useful to consider the example of TDR cer-
tification. Repository certification is fundamentally about
risk assessment. Repositories achieve certification as trust-
worthy by demonstrating their ability to identify and miti-
gate risks, and one type of certification in particular is
based on the ISO 16363: Trustworthy Repositories Audit
and Certification: Criteria Checklist (Consultative Commit-
tee for Space Data Systems, 2012).
An organization that has certified repositories as trust-
worthy using the criteria described in ISO 16363 is the
Center for Research Libraries (CRL) (for instance, Center
for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2018,
2015). ISO 16363 explains that a TDR “will understand
threats to and risks within its systems” (Consultative Com-
mittee for Space Data Systems, 2012, p. 19). It also dis-
cusses financial risks, infrastructure risks, and security
risks, and calls for repositories to identify preservation
risks and provide strategies for dealing with them
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012).
The standard treats risks as concrete and identifiable and
addressable, suggesting an alignment with the classical def-
inition of risk as a quantifiable value based on the probabil-
ity and consequences of a negative event.
• A CRL-administered TDR audit is a process that involves com-
munication among and across repository staff members and
auditors. Perceptions of risk among people involved in the
audit process may vary depending on the way in which risk
information is communicated, and the relationship between the
source and recipient of the message.
• In an audit process, repository staff face complexity in terms of
the technical work of digital preservation, and also in terms of
organizational and economic factors relating to the repository.
Auditors may assess each repository differently depending on
the complexity of the repository environment, the complexity
of their own organization, and/or the complexity of the audit
process itself.
• Participation in the process is required from a variety of people
who have different types of expertise. Trust in the expertise
and knowledge of others is necessary in order to complete the
documentation required.
• Each repository is a separate organization that may shape per-
ceptions of risk for its members in different ways. Auditors also
belong to organizations that may shape their perceptions of risk
in ways that differ from the repositories that they are assessing.
It is also possible that individuals or groups within organiza-
tions will have varying perceptions of risk based on their posi-
tion in the organization.
• Political culture is relevant to TDR certification in part because
of strong ties between political culture and policymaking. Also,
all of the repositories certified by CRL are located in North
America, and it is possible that perceptions of risk within the
audit process will vary across international boundaries.
• Certification following ISO 16363 is all about demonstrating
that repositories can be trusted. The goal of the certification
checklist is for repository staff to demonstrate their ability to
manage risk in a number of areas. As with expertise, the man-
agement of digital repositories depends upon different stake-
holders within the organization having trust in others. The push
for transparency in the audit process is meant to foster trust
among repository staff and with external stakeholders such as
auditors.
• Uncertainty may influence the TDR audit process because the
repository staff members who take part in the process are likely
to have varying levels of expertise and knowledge about the
repository. Additionally, auditors are likely to have varying
levels of knowledge about the repository and may experience
uncertainty based on their own knowledge and expertise about
activities relating to digital preservation.
• Perceptions of risk may vary among repository staff depending
on their awareness of the vulnerabilities that a repository faces.
Perceptions of risk may also vary between repository staff and
auditors, as repository staff experience varying degrees of risk
exposure, and auditors face varying levels of awareness of the
vulnerabilities that repositories and their staff members face.
As the example of TDR certification above demon-
strates, the eight elements that comprise this framework for
the social construction of risk have the potential to influ-
ence perceptions of risk within a repository audit.
Academic research in digital preservation has engaged with
the concept of risk as a knowable, quantifiable figure that tech-
nical systems must be designed to overcome (Barateiro et al.,
2010). This approach to digital preservation relies on a positiv-
istic methodological orientation and a technical perspective
heavily influenced by computer science (Barateiro et al., 2011)
and previous conceptualizations of risk by professional organi-
zations such as the Institute of Risk Management (Institute of
Risk Management, Association of Insurance and Risk Man-
agers, & Public RiskManagement Association, 2002).
Scholars, including Lavoie and Dempsey (2004) have laid
out many ways to investigate digital preservation, including
focusing on digital preservation as a technical, economic,
organizational, or social challenge (Lavoie, 2008; Lavoie &
Dempsey, 2004). Many in the digital preservation community
have focused on technical challenges (for instance, Jantz &
Giarlo, 2007). Digital preservation research focusing on technical
aspects of preservation has examined file formats (for instance,
Lawrence, Kehoe, Rieger, Walters, & Kenney, 2000; Ohshima,
2010), system architecture (for instance, Barateiro, Antunes, &
Borbinha, 2012), IT governance (for instance, Becker, Antunes,
Barateiro, Vieira, & Borbinha, 2011), the reliability of storage
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media (for instance, Baker et al., 2006), mechanisms for
managing distributed backup systems (for instance, Maniatis,
Roussopoulos, Giuli, Rosenthal, & Baker, 2005), and the devel-
opment of technical standards (for instance, Dobratz & Schoger,
2007; Harmsen, 2008).
This article posits that risk in digital preservation should
be considered a social challenge, and builds upon previous
research to present a framework for the social construction of
risk in digital preservation. I argue that digital preservation
risks are not merely technical, economic, or organizational.
Rather, I have shown how ensuring the longevity of digital
information is also a social process in which risks are inter-
preted by individuals. Their subsequent actions are influenced
by social factors that shape the ways in which they perceive
and understand risk. This approach will provide insights about
the ways that people behave in response to information about
risks and the complex social contexts in which they operate.
While the examples provided above focus on digital pres-
ervation activities taking place in organizations such as reposi-
tories, this framework can be applied in any setting where the
long-term preservation of digital content takes place. Indeed,
individuals across a variety of organizations are engaged in
work that contributes to digital preservation, and as the exam-
ple of TDR certification in this section demonstrated, it is not
only the risk perception of repository staff members that mat-
ters for digital preservation but also the perception of reposi-
tory stakeholders and other external groups/individuals who
are in someway involved in the work of digital preservation.
Conclusion
It is time for the digital preservation community to engage
with the concept of risk in a way that accounts for the com-
plex social contexts within which digital preservation takes
place. In this article I have presented a model for the social
construction of risk in digital preservation, which consists of
eight factors: communication, complexity, expertise, organi-
zations, political culture, trust, uncertainty, and vulnerability.
Taken individually, each of these factors can influence how
individuals and groups construct their understanding of risk.
When considered together, they can amplify and/or attenuate
perceptions of risk.
The concept of risk is foundational to the field of digital
preservation. With our increasing reliance on digital informa-
tion, and the central role that it plays in research, education,
government, and commerce, it is important to understand how
the people and groups who carry out the work of digital pres-
ervation construct their understandings of risk. Risk identifica-
tion is an important first step, but understanding how and why
people respond to that information is necessary for the long-
term preservation of digital information.
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